Pass

1. Overview

Secrets live as individual GPG-encrypted files in a directory you control, with no third-party vault server.

Category: OS & Infra.

2. Version and scope assessed

Version assessed: Pinned evidence 3ca13cd8882cae4083c1c478858adbf2e82dd037.

4. Principle profile

5. Fundamental requirements

6. Evidence and verification

• E1: pass stores credentials in local password-store files and exposes a command-line interface for inspection and management. (source), confidence medium
• E2: The store is a directory of independently usable encrypted files and can be migrated by copying the directory and keys. (source), confidence medium
• E3: The show/edit paths directly call GPG decryption on individual .gpg entry files. Store recovery therefore depends on the corresponding decryption keys and GPG environment, not a pass-only proprietary reader. No synthetic key-restoration run is claimed. (source), confidence medium
• E4: The password store and encryption keys are held by the user and can be synchronized with ordinary file tools. (source), confidence high
• E5: Delete removes the working file and, in a Git-backed store, records git rm plus a normal commit rather than history erasure. Re-encryption likewise adds a commit. Importantly yesno returns success without prompting when stdin is not a terminal, so the advertised confirmation is conditional even without --force; older encrypted history is not thereby revoked. (source), confidence medium
• sovereignty: Local encrypted files and user-held keys give strong authority and exit. (source), confidence high
• longevity: E3 is not established for Pass's existing essential-record scope. The previous Longevity finding is replaced by Not assessed, not a verified failure or a positive placeholder. (source), confidence medium
• locality: The core workflow is local and offline. (source), confidence high
• transparency: The positive control observations above do not yet establish whole-scope E5. The methodology requires that minimum before a positive Transparency and Control finding; the previous positive finding is therefore withdrawn to Not assessed, not changed to Does not meet. (source), confidence medium
• E3: Source delegates individual entry decryption to GPG, so the preserved files are not tied to a pass-only proprietary reader. However no corresponding private-key/trust/recipient environment was reconstructed or old encrypted history checked after recipient changes. The declared key and history recovery remains unverified. (source), confidence medium
• E5: Git-backed removal/re-encryption records normal commits rather than erasing old history, and the yes/no helper bypasses prompting on non-terminal input. These are important command/history boundaries, not complete evidence of effective secret-use/export, recipient-change and correction controls in the assessed configuration. (source), confidence medium

7. Migration and recovery

Native storage format: GPG-encrypted files in a plain directory.

Synchronization or runtime model: Git / Syncthing (no commercial cloud).

Example export or inspection command (not verified against any particular version or data set): gpg -d ~/.password-store/infra/root.gpg

8. Architectural strengths

Established strengths and their scope are recorded in the evidence and assessment findings on this page.

9. Architectural limitations

• Source/retained-input inspection only; no installation or application restore performed.
• Actual private-key/trust recovery, prior-history decryption after recipient changes, importer completeness and observed offline behavior remain untested.

10. Assessment findings and remaining work

Verification scenario: Restore a GPG-encrypted tree with private keys and trust settings; re-encrypt for new recipients; test offline.

What may invalidate an overconfident claim: Availability of encrypted files is not recoverability if keys are lost. Protect test secrets.

Documentation starting point: https://www.passwordstore.org/

Evidence update: 23 October 2026

• Resolved: The show/edit paths directly call GPG decryption on individual .gpg entry files. Store recovery therefore depends on the corresponding decryption keys and GPG environment, not a pass-only proprietary reader. No synthetic key-restoration run is claimed. Source.
• Resolved: Delete removes the working file and, in a Git-backed store, records git rm plus a normal commit rather than history erasure. Re-encryption likewise adds a commit. Importantly yesno returns success without prompting when stdin is not a terminal, so the advertised confirmation is conditional even without –force; older encrypted history is not thereby revoked. Source.
• Open: Actual private-key/trust recovery, prior-history decryption after recipient changes, importer completeness and observed offline behavior remain untested. E5 needs effective non-interactive/force, recipient-change, secret-use/export and historical-ciphertext recourse boundaries.

Assessment follow-up: These bounded findings are incorporated into the evidence above. Eligibility and principle ratings are deliberately unchanged; their reconciliation and any blank-status fixes are deferred to the next pass. Reproduction details and retained inputs are in evidence/third-pass/batch-9/.

Human-readable criteria: Can an administrator reproduce, inspect, recover, and operate the system from user-controlled configuration and packages without a vendor-controlled permission path?

Rating reconciliation: 24 October 2026

E3 and E5 remain Not Verified for the existing declared scope. Longevity and Transparency and Control are Not assessed pending their required minimums. This is a targeted evidence decision, not a finding that the product fails. Existing E1, E4 and Locality findings were not re-certified.

Remaining: Actual private-key/trust recovery, prior-history decryption after recipient changes, importer completeness and observed offline behavior remain untested. E5 needs effective non-interactive/force, recipient-change, secret-use/export and historical-ciphertext recourse boundaries.

Next without installing locally: Inspect a synthetic store with non-secret GPG test credentials, recipient policy and Git history, then obtain independently recorded key/trust restoration and approval/history behavior. Do not supply or use real private keys.

The individual decision and provenance are retained in evidence/rating-reconciliation/batch-9/. Overall: Insufficient evidence.

Individually reconciled in rating batch 9 on 24 October 2026. E3/E5 remain Not Verified for explicit missing coverage; dependent unsupported findings corrected. Previously resolved questions are retained, not counted again. E1/E4/Locality were not re-certified by this targeted review. The assessment procedure is described in the methodology.